Kant's transcendental idealism + Hegel's objective idealism + Feuerbach's materialism = Marx's transcendental materialism

1. The absolute object (God as man's ultimate objective) takes the form of the idea (man's idea)...but man's idea also takes forms which should not be mistaken for God's objective.

2. The absolute Idea (Spirit) takes the form of its object, progressing towards it, overcoming any natural obstacle opposing it... therefore what comes into being is 'progress,' as Spirit realizing ever-new limits of possibility, and so, creating something novel.

3. Contingent progress may not always appear as social progress...it could happen purely in our individually (uniquely) creative, aesthetic/pleasure-driven thoughts. Real progress is only evident in our growing knowledge of the world beyond ourselves through scientific methods...our desire for which might belong to our God-given essence…

4. Our knowledge of the external physical world is accessed by us through our individual physical-mental worlds. Our embodied mind, as a being-in-the-world, determines what we acknowledge (perceive and attend to), thus building out our individual mental world with new information consciously or unconsciously integrated into our more or less permeable standing beliefs, and so, this kind of beingness, as a being in-the-world of other beings with objectively-ideally identical beingness, is determined by the material (social) relations between us beings with such a kind of beingness.

The mental content of what is determined in any given epoch is theoretically universally open (a claim not founded in the assertion of our own unlimited creativity or absolute free will, but founded in the assertion of our alienation, which qualifies us from making any such positive statement of fact about our natural possibility. Instead, alienation is a negative claim about our nature; it withholds determining our essence in any concrete way, as notions of creativity might, and yet leaves hope for us to become what we are, which might be something we’ve never been. However, these positions are mirror images of each other. The first being an example of idealism, while the latter grounds the idealism as objectively groundless.

But the content is also relatively relational and contingently limited such that what emerges in creativity is not necessarily for better or worse, but a multiplicity of beauty and horror. Nature is indifferent in this respect, it will not intervene in the human lifeworld to bring about more beauty than horror, we must collectively, consciously guide ourselves in that.

This is why, without understanding Marx’s genealogical intervention in philosophical idealism, and Marxism as a self-social-critical epistemological method for applying theory in practice, Hegelians can also be Nazis, while Nazis cannot also be Marxists.